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Revisiting the Role of Informa-
tion Format in Candidate Evalua-
tion: An 'Update' Model of Evaluation * 
Scott H. Huffmon 
Winthrop University 
Over a decade ago , Lodge , Stroh, and Wahlke (1990) 
wrote that all major models of vote choice and candidate 
evaluation were "black-box " models because they were 
"s ilent about the processes that drive their explanations" 
(p . 13) . In an attempt to peer inside that black-box, 
Rahn , Aldrich , and Borgida (1994) highlight the impor-
tance on candidate evaluation of sophisticatio n and the 
format in which information is received ; they conclude 
that individuals use a memory-based, as opposed to an 
impression driven, model of evaluation. This article of-
fers a re-examination of Rahn, Ald r ich, and Borgida 's 
model . I conclude that their use of fictitious candidates 
and the construction of some of their variables may have 
clouded some of their findings, but several of their theo-
retical assumptions are sound . I also posit an "update" 
model of evaluation that demonstrates individuals tend to 
use a mixed strategy of both on-line and memory-based 
approaches in creating evaluations and high l ights the 
importance of the individual's policy proximity assess-
ment, sophistication, and information format on the 
evaluative process as individuals update thei r evalua-
tions in light of new information . 
• This research is funded by the National Science Foundation (SES-9809223) . 1 would 
like to thank the Social Science Research Laboratory at the Univer.;ity of Mississippi for 
the use of their facilities and John M . Bruce, Robert D. Brown, and Charles E. Smith, Jr. 
for their helpful comments . 
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0 ver a decade ago, Lodge, Stroh, and Wahlke (1990) wrote that all major models of vote choice and candi-date evaluation were "black-box" models because 
they were "silent about the processes that drive their explana-
tions" (p. 13). While many scholars have tried to illuminate the 
dark recesses of that "black-box," we must often settle for more 
prediction than explanation from our models. 
Examples of research that probe the black-box can be found 
in Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) and Rahn, Aldrich, and 
Borgida (1994). The former posits an impression-driven model 
of candidate evaluation, while the latter tests the conclusions of 
Lodge and his colleagues against a memory-based model, con-
cluding that individuals employ a memory-based approach to 
candidate evaluation. This research offers a reexamination of 
Rahn, Aldrich , and Borgida's (1994) model and builds on the 
foundation they laid. 
The crux of the difference between impression-driven and 
memory-based models lies in the role of information in the crea-
tion of an evaluation. Impression-driven models assume that 
evaluations consist of a running tally that is updated with the 
application of new information, the details of which are dis-
carded or buried deep within the memory once the evaluation has 
been updated. Therefore, when asked to produce an evaluation, 
voters need only consult their tally without retrieving the actual 
information that served as its basis. Memory-based models, on 
the other hand, assume no preexisting evaluation, or tally, resid-
ing within the memory. If there is no previous evaluation to rely 
upon, voters must recall detailed information from memory in 
order to form an evaluation. The question of how individuals 
process political information is further complicated, however, 
when we introduce the concepts of motivation, sophistication, 
and information context. 
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Srull and Wyer (1986) demonstrated that when individuals 
pursue the specific purpose of forming an evaluation, an impres-
sion-driven, or on-line, approach is taken. One might assume that 
the campaign season would orient the voter to the goal of form-
ing an evaluation leading up to election day. However, depend-
ing on the nature of the election, character of the candidates, and 
complexity of the issues, the impact of motivation may be 
eclipsed or mitigated by political sophistication. Bargh and Thein 
(1985) and McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh (1990) found sophistica-
tion to have significant impact on the use of an on-line strategy. 
Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995) highlight the impact of 
time as memory fades (the "forgetting curve") and the impor-
tance of campaign information and messages. Further, Rahn, Al-
drich, and Borigda (1994) found that the format in which 
information was received had a significant interactive impact on 
the individual's ability to create candidate evaluations; according 
to their findings, information received in a debate-style format 
contributed to the use of a memory-based approach to candidate 
evaluation. 
Unfortunately, the researcher is confronted with a difficult di-
lemma. In order to test the impact new information on evalua-
tion, the researcher must be certain that the evaluation, once 
given, is really the product of the stimulus information and not 
merely a reflection of a previous evaluation, one held before the 
research began. The traditional way to overcome this problem 
has been to ask the research subject to evaluate fictional candi-
dates. Such was the strategy in the evaluation research done by 
Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) and Rahn, Aldrich, and Bor-
gida (1994). As Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994) note, "[i]n a 
real campaign, it would be virtually impossible to isolate voters 
before they had any exposure to the candidates" (p. 195). 
Using fictitious candidates allows researchers the cleanest 
type of experimental design. Since subjects could not possibly 
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have an opinion prior to the experiment, the evaluation must be 
the result of information presented in the course of the study. 
However, the use of ficticous candidates has an unfortunate side 
effect: conclusions drawn from results based on the use of com-
pletely unknown candidates are not applicable to most real world 
electoral scenarios. If, in real campaigns, individuals never knew 
anything about candidates until they were given specific cam-
paign information, experimental design using fictitious candi-
dates would be directly applicable to the "real world." Rarely, 
however, are voters introduced to new candidates for the first 
time in elections. Although it may be the case more often in local 
politics that one or more prospective candidates are relative or 
complete unknowns, such occurrences are infrequent in elections 
that extend beyond the county line. Given the situation of two 
completely unknown candidates competing for the same office, a 
model that explains how individuals process information and 
how they integrate it into opinions being simultaneously formed 
for the first time is appropriate, but for most elections of note, it 
is simply not the case. It is difficult to demonstrate either impres-
sion-driven or memory-based candidate evaluation strategies 
when there are no long held opinions to be updated using one of 
these models. 
My analysis replicates Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's (1994) 
test of impression-driven versus memory-based evaluation and 
the impact of information context on evaluation, but I use actual 
candidates to create a more realistic evaluative environment. Ad-
ditionally, naturally created variables are used that more accu-
rately reflect respondents' thinking and attitudes, including a 
latent measure of attitudinal strength that thwarts second guess-
ing and artificial attitude justification in respondents' evaluative 
reports. Finally, an "update" model of candidate evaluation is 
introduced. The model controls for the impact of prior opinion 
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while still measuring the impact sophistication, memory, and 
information structure. 
Attitudinal Strength 
Models of comparative candidate evaluation hinge on the ac-
curate measure of the strength of positive or negative opinions 
that individuals hold concerning the candidates. Although easy 
enough to ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove 
of a candidate, it is much more difficult to measure the strength 
of that opinion in an accurate way without forcing respondents to 
conduct an unnatural over-analysis of their opinions. The di-
lemma leads researchers unintentionally to change what they 
want to measure because of the obtrusiveness of the measure-
ment itself. Traditionally, the best way to measure attitudinal 
strength with minimal intrusion has been to ask respondents to 
rate their opinions on a scale-a feeling thermometer or a 
straight-forward like-dislike scale, for example. Although these 
methods keep the artificial noise of over-analysis to a minimum, 
they still create an evaluative environment that is not likely to be 
reproduced in a real electoral setting. 
Attitude strength is of paramount importance in the under-
standing of how individuals process information. One is more 
likely to use strong attitudes when forming evaluations than 
weak ones (Fazio 1993; Krosnick and Petty 1995). What is 
needed is a way to measure latent attitudinal strength without 
forcing respondents to construct an opinion report artificially that 
is more subject to measurement error. Studies in the field of psy-
chology have developed such a measure. 
Researchers in cognitive psychology, led by Russell Fazio 
and others, have used measures of response latency, or reaction 
time, to gauge the accessibility and activation of attitudes (Fazio 
et al. 1982; Powell and Fazio 1984; Fazio et al. 1986; Houston 
and Fazio 1989; Bargh et al. 1992; Doll and Ajzen 1992; Down-
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ing, Judd, and Brauer 1992; Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio 1992; 
and others). Additional research has shown that important atti-
tudes are more accessible than those attitudes of less importance 
(Szalay and Deece 1978). In a meta-analysis of nine previous 
experiments, Fazio (1993) confirmed that stronger attitudes lead 
to greater accessibility, as measured by reaction time. Similar 
conclusions were reached by Bargh et al. (1992) who found that 
subjects demonstrated faster reaction times for their strongest 
attitudes and slower reaction times for their weakest. Fazio and 
Williams (1986) found that evaluations of Republican candidates 
in presidential and vice presidential debates were more favorable 
among Reagan supporters and that this relationship was stronger 
among individuals whose attitudes about Reagan were more ac-
cessible. In short, extensive research has confirmed that reaction 
times, or response latencies, serve as accurate measures of how 
strongly an individual holds an attitude. Drawing on this re-
search, I use response latencies of expressions of approval or 
disapproval of candidates as a measure of the strength of respon-
dents' evaluative attitudes. The response latency measure has 
additional advantages: it prevents experiment participants from 
being "tipped off'' as to the real nature of the attitudinal inquiry. 
Research Design 
Computer surveys were administered in the Social Science 
Research Laboratory at the University of Mississippi. Subjects 
were recruited from introductory political science courses at the 
university; 107 students participated in the experiment. Respon-
dents ranged in age from 18 to 40 years old. Use of the standard 
National Election Study (NES) questions revealed that the ma-
jority, 82.17%, considered themselves either "strong" or "not so 
strong" partisans while 17.83% considered themselves to be po-
litical "independents." More than half of the independents were 
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partisan leaners, leaving only 7 .92% who considered them selves 
to be pure independents. 
Although some may question the validity of studies that use 
college students as subjects, David Sears (1986) notes that the 
consensus in the field of psychology is that ''reliance on college 
student subjects does not have major negative consequences" for 
experiments. Sears (1986) did, highlight, however, several possi-
ble pitfalls of the use of college students. In fact, the major find-
ings of Sears' research were that college students are likely to 
have less crystallized attitudes and stronger cognitive skills. Both 
of these conditions would work systematically against the mod-
els in this research, suppressing the expected relationships. One 
might infer that any significant findings would be magnified in 
the public. 
Upon arrival at the computer lab, subjects were told that they 
would be participating in a political opinion survey. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to computer stations. The station as-
signment would determine which type of stimulus, the informa-
tion context, the subject would see (see Appendix A). For the 
stimulus, subjects were exposed to information about Al Gore 
and George W. Bush in one of two formats. In the candidate-
centered format, information was presented separately for each 
candidate. Subjects saw all of one candidate's positions on the 
issues followed by the positions of the other candidate on those 
issues. In the dimension-centered format (also commonly re-
ferred to as "debate-style'' format) information was presented 
separately for each issue. Presented with each issue separately, 
subjects saw one candidate's position on that issue followed by 
the other candidate's position on that issue before being pre-
sented with the next issue. 
Subjects first answered a series of twelve questions on 
whether they approved or disapproved of several items. The first 
three questions were non-political and designed to familiarize the 
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subject with the questionnaire format. The remaining questions 
probed approval or disapproval of George W. Bush, Al Gore, 
politicians in general, the two major political parties, parties in 
general, and the institutions of government. Unbeknownst to par-
ticipants, their reaction time to each question was recorded as 
they responded. The next section of the survey asked subjects to 
identify the party affiliation of several notable political actors 
and to match policy positions to the correct political party as 
well as express their own policy preference. Subjects were then 
asked to report their partisan identification and ideology. Ideol-
ogy was measured on a scale ranging from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative . Subjects were then asked to place 
George W. Bush, Al Gore, and the two major political parties on 
the ideology scale. At this point, participants were presented with 
the stimulus that provided policy information for George W. 
Bush and Al Gore. 
The information was presented in either a candidate-centered 
format, where subjects saw all of one candidate's views followed 
by all of the other candidates' views, or a dimension-centered 
format, in which an issue was presented followed by both candi-
date's views on that issue (see above). The information was 
taken from the candidates' official internet websites. The infor-
mation presented in both stimuli was identical. Immediately after 
the stimuli, subjects were asked again to place George W. Bush 
and Al Gore on ideology scales. To serve as a distractor task, the 
participants were surveyed on a number of non-political items 
before being presented with a quiz on the information that had 
been presented in the stimuli. Finally, subjects were again asked 
the series of approve-disapprove questions. As before, reaction 
times were taken for the approval questions. 
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Creation of Variables 
Structure (format). Respondents viewed information of Al 
Gore's and George W. Bush's policy positions on four issues (see 
Appendix A). The policy position information was presented in 
either in a candidate-centered format (coded 0) or in a dimen-
sion-centered format ( coded 1 ). 
Sophistication. Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (RAB) based their 
sophistication measure on the established composite method. An 
index was created by standardizing and summing four variables: 
self-reported interest in politics, exposure to television news, 
behavioral participation in political activities, and the number of 
correct answers to a five-question political information test. 
These four variables were collapsed into a dummy variable along 
the median score: 0 = "non-sophisticates" and 1 = ''political so-
phisticates." The sophistication measure used in the test of 
RAB 's model presented here is also a composite score, although 
different components and summing techniques were used. 
For the research presented here, pre-test interviews with non-
participants revealed that individuals who reported similar expo-
sure levels to television news were often referring to different 
types and qualities of newscasts. For example, some who re-
ported high levels of exposure to television news were referring 
to watching a few minutes of CNN's Headline News several 
times a day, while others meant never missing the local news, 
while yet others referred to being "CNN junkies." Consequently, 
I made a judgment that the inclusion of a question addressing 
exposure to television news in the composite sophistication 
measure might lead to intrusive "noise" in the measure. More-
over, the mediating nature of political efficacy for the relation-
ship between sophistication and participation in political 
activities led me also not to use the media exposure question. In 
the final wash, it was decided that sophistication would best be 
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tapped by using base measures of political knowledge coupled 
with self-reported interest in politics. 
The measure of political sophistication used in the alternate 
model was created by averaging the scores from two political 
knowledge tests and weighting this average with the subjects' 
political interest. The first test asked respondents to identify the 
partisan affiliation of several prominent political actors, while 
the second asked subjects to match policy positions to the correct 
party. These scores were collapsed into a dummy variable along 
the median score: 0 = "non-sophisticates" and 1 = "political so-
phisticates ." 
One might argue that by collapsing the political sophistication 
variable, valuable information inherent in its original variance is 
lost. The question appears to be whether the trade-off between 
subtlety and parsimony is valid. In fact, the question is a bit more 
complicated. A defense of the use of a collapsed measure of so-
phistication along a median split begins with the observation that 
a collapsed measure is "a standard measure of political sophisti-
cation" (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995: 314). A collapsed 
measure of sophistication is the norm across seminal works that 
serve as a standard for this research (see Lodge, McGraw, and 
Stroh 1989; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990; Zaller 1990; Rahn, 
Aldrich, and Borgida 1994; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). 
Moreover, while it is possible to gain greater nuance with more 
subtle gradations, the collapsed measure presents a direct com-
parison with the model of evaluation created by Rahn, Aldrich, 
and Borgida (1994). Use of a collapse measure allows for more 
direct comparisons with their work. 
Party Identification. While both this research and that by 
RAB use the traditional seven point partisan scale, there is a key 
difference in how the measures were constructed. This research 
used the traditional NES format and battery of questions. A score 
of "l" represents a strong Democrat and a score of "7" repre-
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sents a strong Republican. RAB used one question showing re-
spondents all seven points on the partisanship scale; the result 
was an astounding 75% of RAB's respondents claiming political 
independence. The use of the multi-question NES format re-
sulted in only 17 .83% of the subjects of this research asserting 
that they were political independents. The implications of the 
difference are discussed further in the examination of the results. 
Policy Similarity. RAB asked subjects to place themselves on 
five seven-point policy scales. All those responding more con-
servatively, on the "Republican" side of the scale, were coded 
"l," those in the center, "0," and those on the "Democratic" side 
of the scale were coded "-1." These scores were summed to cre-
ate a +5 to -5 scale representing proximity to Republican or De-
mocratic policy positions, respectively. The score served as a 
proxy for proximity to the fictitious Republican and Democratic 
candidates of the RAB study. 
For the alternate model presented here, subjects were asked to 
place themselves on an ideology scale immediately after answer-
ing questions about their policy preferences. Subjects were also 
asked to place George W. Bush and Al Gore on ideology scales 
immediately after reading the stimuli containing their policy po-
sitions. A relative proximity score was created by subtracting the 
absolute value of the difference between the respondent's ideol-
ogy and his or her perception of Gore's ideology from the abso-
lute value of the difference between the respondent's ideology 
and his or her perception of Bush's ideology. More than just 
similarity, this calculus creates a relative, or comparative similar-
ity score. Higher scores reflect a greater proximity to Gore. In 
the formula, 18 represents respondents' placement of Bush on the 
ideology scale, 10 represents their placement of Gore, and IR 
represents their own self-placement: 
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Comparative Memory. The creation of this variable marks 
one of the more notable differences between this model and that 
of RAB. The alternate model includes a memory variable. The 
memory variable reflects respondents' ability to remember more 
facts about one candidate than about the other candidate, 
weighted by their approval of each candidate. After completing a 
distractor task, respondents were quizzed on the information they 
had seen in the stimuli. The comparative memory variable was 
created by subtracting the number of correct Bush/policy 
matches weighted by Bush's approval rating from the number of 
correct Gore/policy matches weighted by Gore's approval rating. 
Approval was coded "l" while disapproval was coded "-1." This 
score was weighted by the overall percentage correct on the post-
stimulus quiz. 
RAB, on the other hand, created a memory score that was 
"positively [or] negatively valenced" in a fundamentally differ-
ent manner. Respondents were asked to list everything that they 
could remember about the candidates. They were then instructed 
to note whether they considered these items positive, negative, or 
neutral. A "net" memory score was created for both candidates 
by subtracting the number of recalled items considered negative 
from those considered positive. The net score for one candidate 
was subtracted from the other. 
It is a standard practice to incorporate participants' affective 
responses to what they recall, but the method used in the alter-
nate model is much more latent than that employed by RAB, 
making it more accurate and less prone to post hoc justification 
by the respondents. In the alternate model, information recalled 
is valenced by the underlying level of approval for the candidate 
who espouses the recalled position. 
Comparative Candidate Evaluation. The biggest difference 
between RAB and the alternate model is in the dependent vari-
able. First, and most importantly, the alternative model uses the 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
INFORMATION FORMAT AND CANDIDATE EVALUATION 47 
evaluation of real candidates in lieu of fictitious ones. Partici-
pants were asked to evaluate George W. Bush and Al Gore. The 
experiment was conducted in November 1999, at a time when 
each man was considered the front-runner for his party's nomi-
nation, but no national debates had taken place. 
RAB asked respondents to rate fictitious candidates on a 
seven point like-dislike scale. The comparative candidate evalua-
tion was constructed by subtracting one candidate's score from 
the other. The alternate model uses a measure of attitudinal 
strength based on attitude accessibility as discussed above. After 
reading their respective policy positions in the stimuli, respon-
dents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of Bush 
and Gore. Their response latencies to these questions were 
measured in order to gauge the accessibility of their opinions. 
Since shorter reaction times equate to greater accessibility, all of 
the latencies were subtracted from the highest score, that is, the 
longest reaction time. The procedure reversed the accessibility 
measure so that higher scores equated to greater accessibility. 
Approval was coded "l" for "approve," "-1" for "disap-
prove," and "0" for "don't know." The approval score was then 
multiplied by accessibility to create a measure of evaluative 
strength for each candidate. Bush's evaluation was subtracted 
from Gore's to create a comparative candidate evaluation, stan-
dardized by dividing by the average accessibility for both candi-
dates. In the formula, GAP and GAc represent approval and 
accessibility for Gore, respectively, while BAP and BAc represent 
the same measures for Bush: 
(GAP *GAc)-(BAP *BAc) 
GAC +BAC 
2 
Allowing "don't know" as a response, and coding it as "0," 
makes an important distinction in the creation of the variable. 
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Not forcing respondents to espouse an opinion that they may not 
really hold reduces measurement error. Further, these non-
attitudes are, indeed, "zeroed out" of the attitudinal strength cal-
culus by coding them as "O"; therefore, it is impossible to have 
either strong or weak non-attitudes, a fact that controls the intro-
duction of measurement error by non-attitudes as noted by Con-
verse (1970). 
Questions about Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's (1994) Model 
It is likely that several of RAB 's findings are the result of 
how they constructed their model. After being introduced to the 
"candidates" for the first time in the video stimulus, subjects 
were asked to rate each candidate on a seven point like-dislike 
scale. Their dependent variable, comparative candidate evalua-
tion, was constructed by subtracting one candidate's score from 
the score of the other candidate. The primary bases for liking or 
disliking a candidate would have been partisanship and an opin-
ion formed from the policy positions they just heard each candi-
date espouse. There were no other available tools for evaluation, 
except, perhaps, visual affect, which the model is not designed to 
measure. 
The key independent variables were (a) an interaction be-
tween the format (structure in which the information was pre-
sented) and comparative candidate memory and (b) an 
interaction between these two variables and the subjects' politi-
cal sophistication. However, there may be a problem in the con-
struction of the comparative candidate memory variable, the key 
variable in both of these interaction terms. In RAB, comparative 
candidate memory was constructed by having the subjects list 
everything they could remember about what they had just heard 
or seen. Subjects then went back and noted whether information 
they had listed about the candidates was positive, negative, or 
neutral. The number of negative items for each candidate was 
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subtracted from the number of positive items. Finally, one candi-
date's "net" memory score was subtracted from the other candi-
date's "net" memory score. 
The dependent variable measures whether subjects like or dis-
like the candidates based on the policy positions they just heard. 
A primary component of the comparative candidate memory 
score is based on whether subjects like or dislike what they just 
heard: the policy positions of the candidates. Since the bases of 
both of these variables are so intricately interconnected, it seems 
unlikely that any significant relationship between them, or any 
interactive term of which they are components, could be attrib-
uted accurately to anything other than their common roots. The 
broader implication of this fact is that the model, although ingen-
iously conceived, may not offer a fair test of memory-based ver-
sus impression-driven evaluation because of potential bias in the 
variable construction. Further, if there is a question about the 
construction of key variables, the test of the influence of infor-
mation structure, an important contribution to the literature on 
evaluation, may be flawed as well. Simply put, the use of ficti-
tious candidates, for whom it is impossible to test a "running 
tally," the construction of the memory variable that mimics that 
of the dependent variable, and the non-traditional construction of 
the partisanship variable, which, as noted above, netted 75% of 
participants claiming to be independents, limits the ability of the 
RAB model to test the original hypotheses. 
Expectations and Results of Model Comparison 
This analysis offers a more realistic test of the RAB model, 
using variables that are more naturally constructed, yet con-
trolled by experimental design. Based on research from the field 
of cognitive psychology, the dependent variable used here re-
flects the strength of respondents' evaluations of Gore relative to 
the strength of their evaluation of Bush. The alternatively created 
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comparative memory score is more latently valenced, and, there-
fore, offers a direct test of the impact of information recall on 
candidate evaluation without the confounding effect of introduc-
ing an evaluation of the information provided by the candidate. 
The results of the model comparison may be found in Table 1. 
In the alternate model, only partisanship and policy similarity 
drive comparative candidate evaluation, explaining more than 
half of the model variance. The notable increase in amount of 
variance explained is likely due to the use of the traditional three 
part NES question to determine partisanship as opposed to show-
ing subjects all seven points on the partisanship scale and allow-
ing them to position themselves on the scale. Note that because 
the alternative model uses Gore as the baseline candidate, and 
higher numbers on the partisanship scale represent Republicans, 
the relationship between evaluation and partisanship should be 
negative; the directional difference with RAB reflects their use 
of the Republican as the baseline candidate. The increase in the 
size and significance of the policy similarity variable is likely the 
result of a direct comparison to subjects' perceptions of Gore's 
and Bush's policy positions as opposed to a broader similarity to 
the general policies of the candidates' parties. 
The use of a variable measuring the quality and content of 
memory, without a conscious evaluation of its contents, shows 
that recall memory does not appear to be a driving factor in can-
didate evaluation . However, RAB's findings should not be read-
ily dismissed. Their assumptions were based on solid theory. 
Perhaps the failure of this variable in the replication is related to 
a problem with the dependent variable in the alternate model. 
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TABLE 1 
Regression on Comparative Candidate Evaluation 
on Memory, Information Structure, and Political Sophistication 
RAB Alternate 
Model* Model Variable 
.28+ -.29§ 
Partinship (.16) (.06) 
. 18+ 
.17§ Policy Similarity (.09) (.05) 
.02 
.00003 Comparative memory (.11) (.00002) 
.16 -.00001 
Comparative Memory X Sophistication (.14) (.00002) 
.32! -.00004 
Comparative Memory X Structure (.12) (.00003) 
Comparative Memory X Sophistication -.47! .00005 
X Structure (.17) (.00003) 
-.68 .52 
Sophistication (.56) (.29) 
-.18 .03 
Structure (.54) (.30) 
-.37 -.11 
Sophistication X Structure (.81) (.43) 
Adjusted R2 .33 .54 
N 104 101 
•Reproduced from Table I, p. I 98 in Rahn, Wendy M ., John H. Aldrich, and 
Eugene Borgida. I 994. "Individual and Contextual Variations in Political 
Candidate Appraisal. " American Political Science Review 88:193-99. 
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients ; standard errors are in 
parentheses. +p < .05 1P < .01 §p < .001 
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The formula posits that in a more realistic setting, individuals 
integrate new infonnation by checking this information against 
prior "impressions," that is, individuals' previously created prox-
imity assessments. Individuals' initial assessment of the candi-
date (subconsciously logged impressions of the candidate's 
ideological and policy positions) relative to individuals' estab-
lished ideological preferences must be consulted in light of new 
information. As they update the assessment of their proximity to 
the candidates based on new information, they will update their 
evaluations. 
The ability to update impressions is likely to be mediated by 
sophistication, dependent on information structure, and individu-
als' relative recall ability. Measuring these phenomena requires 
the use of a mixed evaluative strategy. When asked to create an 
evaluation, individuals compare their existing, or "on-line," as-
sessment to new information in their memories. The updated 
model draws on research by Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 
(1995) to posit the mixed strategy. Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 
(1995) highlight the importanC,;e of campaign message, but note 
that the utility of memory decays as people forget specific items. 
A mixed strategy is adopted in the updated model because it is 
believed that individuals will draw from direct memories of 
campaign messages if they have any, but will also rely on the 
relation of new memories to previously created impressions; im-
pressions formed, in part, from forgotten memories of previous 
messages. 
To test the updated theory, a variable measuring the proximity 
reassessment function occurring before the evaluative update is 
needed. A variable was created reflecting the policy similarity 
correction. The variable reflects the change in individuals' as-
sessments of policy proximity from before and after the intro-
duction of new information. A measure of similarity ( described 
above) is taken before ( denoted with a subscript "1 ") the intro-
VOL. 31 2003 
52 HUFFMON 
An "Update" Model of Evaluation 
The alternate model presented above is open to the criticism 
that all of the relationships are confounded by the influence of 
prior opinion, the reason RAB used fictitious candidates. For 
example, an individual's opinion of Gore or Bush may very well 
be memory based, but drawn from the wealth of information re-
ceived prior to the introduction of the stimulus and, therefore, 
would show no relationship to a memory score based solely on 
recollection of the stimulus. 
The following formula controls for the influence of prior 
opinion on candidate evaluation. Comparative candidate evalua-
tion is measured before any new information is introduced to the 
subjects, as well as after the introduction of the controlled infor-
mation. The dependent variable in this model represents change 
in comparative candidate evaluation from "before" (T1) to "af-
ter" (T2) the presentation of new information, the introduction of 
which is controlled by experimental design. Both pre- and post-
stimulus comparative candidate evaluations are standardized to 
allow comparability and control for decreased response time 
based solely on familiarity with experimental procedure. By de-
sign, any change in comparative candidate evaluation is the re-
sult of the introduction of this information. In the formula, GAP1 
and GAc1, and BAP, and BAci, represent approval and accessibil-
ity for Gore and Bush prior to the presentation of the stimuli 
while GAP2 and GAc2, and BAn and BAe2, indicate the same meas-
ures after the presentation of the stimuli: 
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duction of the stimulus, representing the current assessment, or 
"tally," and another is taken after the introduction of the stimulus 
(denoted with a subscript "2"). The difference between the be-
fore and after measures is the policy similarity correction score. 
It represents the impact of the new information on the assess-
ment of similarity. 
In the formula, Ia1 and l8I represent the respondent's place-
ment of Gore and Bush prior to the introduction of the stimuli, 
while Io2 and l82 reflect respondent's placement of Gore and 
Bush after viewing the stimuli. Respondents' self-placement is 
represented by IR.. Measures of partisanship, sophistication, 
structure, and comparative memory are the same as above: 
The full model posits 
Change in Comparative Candidate Evaluation = a + 
bJ(Partisanship) + bi(Comparative Memory) + 
b.i(Structure) + b4 (Sophistication) + bi_ Policy Similarity 
Correction [PSC] ) + b6{PSC * Sophistication) + 
b7(Comparative Memory * Sophistication) + b8(PSC * 
Structure)+ b9 (PSC * Comparative Memory). 
Partisanship is still expected to play a significant role; again, 
because of the coding scheme, the coefficient should be negative. 
Comparative memory is expected to be significant due to the 
importance of campaign message recall in evaluation. However, 
because of the construction of the dependent variable, the sign 
should be negative. If respondents can produce an evaluation as 
quickly (creating no significant impact) or more quickly (induc-
ing a positive sign) then it would seem that respondents are not 
integrating new information in their memory. However, if they 
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are drawing from their memory, they should have to pause as 
new information is integrated into candidate evaluation. Policy 
similarity correction should have a negative impact as well. If a 
notable reassessment of one's relative proximity to the candi-
dates must occur, then it seems logical that one must pause to do 
this. Whether the process is significant likely hinges on the im-
portance of the interaction of proximity variable with sophistica-
tion and with structure. On their own, structure and 
sophistication are not expected to be significant since their influ-
ence is likely to be mediated by other variables in the model, 
hence the interactive terms. 
The interaction between policy similarity correction and so-
phistication should be significant and negative. Respondents who 
have a greater discrepancy between pre- and post-stimulus policy 
assessment should pause as they re-evaluate the candidates; 
however only the sophisticated have the ability to reevaluate, 
meaning that the "pause" should occur only among the sophisti-
cated. A deeper understanding of the process might be seen by 
comparing it to findings by McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh (1990) 
regarding information overload and non-sophisticates . In their 
model, those who are overloaded by a change in policy similarity 
correction discount the change allowing the post-stimulus com-
parative evaluation to be made as quickly, or perhaps even more 
quickly because of other factors. Another way to put it is that the 
unsophisticated will fail to recognize that their previous assess-
ment was in error; therefore, no change should be seen for them. 
The interaction between comparative memory and sophistica-
tion should be positive and significant. The politically sophisti-
cated should be better equipped to apply the newly acquired 
information to their evaluation. 
The interaction between policy similarity correction and 
structure should be positive and significant if information format 
truly makes a difference. The argument is that the debate-style 
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format makes it easier to catalog information in order to deter-
mine whether a correction of the respondent's understanding of 
policy similarity is necessary. The debate format allows for the 
easier creation of a "checklist" of policy position proximities. 
Because of the "forgetting curve" (see Lodge, Steenbergen, and 
Brau 1995), the previous proximity assessment is likely the re-
sult of an impression driven evaluation. If that evaluation is to be 
corrected in light of the memory of recently acquired informa-
tion, then this process should be facilitated by a format allowing 
for maximum distinction between the candidates on each policy 
issue. The result would be the use of a mixed strategy for evalua-
tion facilitated by the format of the information. Previous im-
pressions are being updated with new information from recent 
memory and the debate-style format presents the information in 
the most accessible manner. 
The interaction between policy similarity correction and 
comparative memory should be significant and negative. Higher 
scores on the component variables of the interaction indicate that 
respondents having more information in recent memory to con-
sult must do more correction to their previous proximity assess-
ment. Comparisons between earlier and later information should 
take longer, resulting in a negative relationship with the depend-
ent variable. However, because a mixed strategy is theorized, a 
variable representing both memory-based information and im-
pression-derived information should be significant. 
Findings 
The results of the "update" model may be found in Table 2. 
As expected, partisanship still plays a significant role in evalua-
tion. On its own, sophistication did not reach statistical signifi-
cance: this was expected because of the influence of 
sophistication in the interactions. The same is true for the struc-
ture variable. Also as expected comparative memory was signifi-
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cant and in the expected direction, lending some support to the 
memory based approach suggested in RAB. Policy similarity 
correction, however, did not reach statistical significance, indi-
cating that if an on-line ("impression-driven") strategy is used, it 
is mediated by some other variable and/or is part of a mixed 
strategy. 
Lending evidence to the possibility of the use of a mixed 
strategy, the interaction between policy similarity correction and 
sophistication worked as expected, meaning that sophisticated 
individuals are more likely to pause as they update their com-
parative candidate evaluation in order to integrate their new as-
sessment of policy similarity. However, the pause effect only 
occurs when individuals must adjust, or correct, their assessment 
of the candidates' ideologies after being given information on 
their policy positions. Further, the pause only happens if indi-
viduals are sophisticated enough to realize that their original as-
sessment was in error. We are almost seeing a snapshot of 
individuals' thought process as they reevaluate candidates in 
light of new information. 
Politically sophisticated respondents do seem more likely to 
pause and ponder the implications of erroneous previous impres-
sion driven (or "on-line") evaluations as they update their 
evaluations. Finding evidence for the on-line strategy here as 
well as the memory based strategy demonstrated above seems to 
confirm the hypothesis of the use of a mixed strategy. 
The interaction between comparative memory and sophistica-
tion was significant and in the expected direction. Applying re-
cently acquired information to an evaluation is easier for those 
who are more politically sophisticated. As evidenced by this and 
the previous variable, the ability to use efficiently a mixed strat-
egy seems to be related to political sophistication. 
• The interaction between policy similarity correction and 
structure was significant and in the expected direction, as well. If 
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respondents need to reassess their relative policy proximity to 
candidates, the debate-style format, highlighting the comparative 
policy positions of the candidates, makes it easier to do so. 
Finally, the interaction between policy similarity correction 
and comparative memory (variables representing an impression-
driven evaluative strategy and a memory-based strategy, respec-
tively) is significant, and in the predicted direction. The results 
produce further evidence of the use of a mixed strategy. If indi-
viduals are applying information from recent memory to an 
TABLE2 
An "Update" Model of Candidate Evaluation 
Regression of Change in Candidate Evaluation on Policy Correction, 






Policy Similarity Correction 
Policy Similarity Correction X Sophistication 
Comparative Memory X Sophistication 
Policy Similarity Correction X Structure 

























Note : Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients ; standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. +p < .05 tp < .01 
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evaluation that is significantly different from earlier impressions 
of the candidates, then the comparison takes more time, causing 
pauses as candidate evaluations are updated. 
Conclusions 
The research presented here accomplishes two things. First, it 
has replicated the work by Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994) 
using real candidates and alternatively created variables. Second, 
it builds upon RAB and other research to offer a model of candi-
date evaluation that maps the processes used by individuals to 
update their comparative evaluations. In so doing, the "update" 
model offers support for a mixed strategy of candidate evalua-
tion. 
The reexamination of RAB 's model calls into question the 
construction of several of their variables and several of their 
findings. However, much of their theory and many of their as-
sumptions appear to be correct. The common roots of the con-
struction of comparative candidate evaluation and comparative 
candidate memory cast doubt upon the accuracy of their findings 
regarding the relationship between these two variables and the 
relationships between comparative candidate evaluation and all 
interactive independent variables of which comparative candi-
date memory is a component. However, the difference is with 
their measures, not their theory. Abandoning the standard NES 
battery of questions measuring partisanship in favor of showing 
respondents all seven points of the partisanship scale at once, 
raises concerns about the validity of their partisanship variable. 
The minimal role of partisanship in their model is pr9bably be-
cause of variable measurement. Moreover, the use of fictitious 
candidates biases the model against the possibility of finding 
evidence for an impression-driven approach to candidate evalua-
tion: respondents cannot have an impression evaluating candi-
dates of whom they have never heard. Therefore, even a failure 
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to reject the null hypothesis that comparative candidate memory 
does not drive the comparative evaluation of fictitious candidates 
in RAB's model cannot be interpreted as supporting the theory of 
impression-driven evaluation. Finally, their memory score is 
likely to show a significant relationship to their dependent vari-
able because of the construction of both variables 
Although this article questions several about their measures, 
it does not cast doubt on Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's theoretical 
contribution to the literature. Their model may not include a full 
test of memory-based versus impression-driven evaluation, but it 
does highlight the important role that information context, or 
format, plays in the evaluative process. The "update" model of 
evaluation presented here builds upon and expands that contribu-
tion. 
All models of evaluation that use real political figures as their 
objects of appraisal are open to the criticism that the researcher 
cannot determine if the reported evaluation is the product of his 
or her independent variables, or simply reflects a long held opin-
ion that preceded the measures of the model. The update model 
presented here controls for this problem by measuring compara-
tive candidate evaluation both before and after the introduction 
of the stimulus information. By subtracting the measure taken 
prior to the introduction of new information from the post-
stimulus measure, one is left with a variable that measures the 
effect of current information on candidate evaluations. Individu-
als do draw on recent memory to make evaluations, but there is 
evidence that they consult previous impressions as well. 
Realizing that the information presented in the study might 
differ from what subjects "thought they knew" about the candi-
dates, this analysis measures the change in individuals' perceived 
proximity to candidates. The policy similarity correction inter-
acts with sophistication, structure (information format), and 
comparative memory. The interaction between perceived prox-
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imity to a candidate and political sophistication demonstrates 
that receiving information incongruous with previous assess-
ments produces a discrepancy more readily recognized by those 
sophisticated enough to pick up on the inconsistency. 
It appears that individuals assess new information to update 
their candidate evaluations; however, the ability to do so is me-
diated by sophistication and facilitated by the "pre-sorted," 
checklist nature of information provided in a dimension-
centered, or debate, format. Information received this way is 
more readily applied to proximity assessments that are then used 
to update evaluations, or the information is examined for dis-
crepancies, depending on individual sophistication. The update 
model lends support to both the memory-based and on-line 
evaluation debate, suggesting that individuals tend to use a 
mixed strategy of evaluation. Although the function of recall 
memory is important on its own, it also serves as a tool to update 
the previous on-line tally. Both the on-line impression and mem-
ory recall play a role in the creation of an evaluation. It is possi-
ble that as the salience of the new information diminishes, its 
accessibility in the memory fades eventually leaving only an im-
pression of the assessment created because of it. If true, then the 
use of an on-line, memory-based, or mixed strategy may well 
depend, in part, on a time and salience factor. Hopefully, future 
research will be able to answer this question. 
Not addressed in the update model is how long the specifics 
of the new information remain in the memory of individuals and 
at what point the new information becomes part of the overall 
"impression" of candidates while the details of the information 
are lost. The loss of memory detail is referred to as "decay" or 
the "forgetting curve" (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). 
However, the finding of a mixed strategy of evaluation does add 
to the memory-based versus impression-driven debate (see 
Hastie and Park 1986; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge, 
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Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990; 
Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994; Bargh and Thein 1985). Natu-
rally, since evaluation is such an important part of vote choice 
this has direct bearing on models of vote choice. 
Another finding of this research is that the format in which 
information is received makes a difference in individuals' ability 
to process information and recall it to update their existing can-
didate evaluations. The important implications for this finding 
relate to the role of the media and campaigns in the calculus of 
individual voters. It has already been established that the struc-
tural features of the presentation of information in television im-
pact viewer attentiveness involuntarily (Lang 1990; Thorson, 
Reeves, and Schleuder 1985). There is also ample evidence that 
campaign messages have a substantial impact on evaluations (see 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Bartels 1993; Marcus 
and MacKuen 1993; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). This 
impact is independent of recall. In fact, if only recall played a 
role in evaluations, campaigns would matter little as time robbed 
them of their effect on decision-making with regard to long-term 
(non-election specific) evaluations (Lodge, Steenbergen, and 
Brau 1995). 
Given the role of campaigns, however, these findings imply 
that new information garnered in campaigns is checked against 
existing impressions for comparability and used to update one's 
evaluation and this process is facilitated when the information is 
received in a dimension-centered format. Campaign information 
is relevant as it contributes to the impression used to create the 
evaluation and more effective when it is presented in the most 
digestible form. However, political sophisticates are more likely 
to give pause while creating an updated evaluation when the in-
formation received runs counter to their previously established 
impression. Sophisticates may be "screening" information for 
congruity, but their ability to do so may be related to the format 
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of the information. This greatly increases the importance of not 
only campaigns, in general, but also specific types of campaigns 
in the formation of political evaluations and, through evaluation, 
voter choice. 
My findings have implications beyond those directly tested in 
the models. For example, one of the broader implications regard-
ing information context, or structure, might speak to the way the 
media cover political campaigns and candidates. If information 
is received in a dimension-centered format, it appears to aid in-
formation processing as individuals reassess candidates and seek 
to comparatively evaluate them, is there an obligation on the 
media---or the candidates themselves-to provide information in 
the most digestible form? Given the fact that sophistication me-
diates the impact of policy reassessment on evaluation, what are 
the obligations to those with less political savvy? Such norma-
tive questions are left to future research. 
APPENDIX A 
Note: All information is taken from official candidate websites. 
Candidate-Centered Stimulus 
George W. Bush. George W. Bush has issued several statements 
concerning his position on some of the most important issues of the 
presidential campaign of 2000. Bush has stated that there should be no 
reduction in Social Security benefits for retirees or near-retirees. He 
also opposes any tax increase for Social Security and is against the in-
vestment of Social Security funds in the stock market by the govern-
ment. With regard to Medicare, Bush supports providing more choice 
and more private sector alternatives for the elderly. He has also spoken 
in favor of medical savings accounts and offering prescription drug 
benefits to Medicare recipients. On gun control, Bush opposes the gov-
ernment mandated registration of all guns owned by law abiding citi-
zens and supports their constitutional right to own guns. He has spoken 
in favor of the stronger enforcement of existing gun laws instead of the 
creation of additional ones. Bush is in favor of instant background 
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checks at gun shows. On the topic of education, Bush supports a 
"school voucher" type program that would give parents federal funds to 
be used for public and private school choice and innovative education 
programs. He further supports implementation of state accountability 
systems in which students are tested every year in grades 3-8 in reading 
and math in order to gauge the effectiveness of school 
systems. 
Al Gore. Al Gore has addressed his issue positions on several of the 
most important issues of the presidential campaign of 2000. In order to 
keep Social Security solvent, Gore supports the investment of part of 
the budget surplus in the stock market and scaling back some benefit 
levels. He would also like to eliminate the limit on what older Ameri-
cans on Social Security can earn. On Medicare, Gore has spoken in 
favor of a prescription drug option for all Medicare beneficiaries. He 
has also suggested eliminating the deductible and all co-payments on 
preventive benefits covered by Medicare. With regard to gun control, 
Gore supports the passage of new laws designed to keep guns off the 
streets. In the past, Gore worked to help enact a ban on assault weap-
ons. He also has supported the Brady Law which requires background 
checks for gun purchases and imposes a five day waiting period for 
those states without "insta~t background checks." On the topic of edu-
cation, Gore opposes "school voucher" programs, instead supporting 
additional funding made available to states for the purpose of reducing 
drop-out rates and increasing student achievement in failing school 
districts. Gore also wants to use technology to increase educational 
productivity and increase the number of computers in public schools. 
Dimension-Centered Stimulus 
Please read the following information about the policy positions of 
the two leading candidates for the Presidential Election of 2000. 
Social Security. George W. Bush: has stated that there should be no 
reduction in Social Security benefits for retirees or near-retirees. He 
also opposes any tax increase for Social Security and is against the in-
vestment of Social Security funds in the stock market by the govern-
ment. 
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Al Gore: In order to keep social security solvent, Gore supports the 
investment of part of the budget surplus in the stock market and scaling 
back some benefit levels. He would also like to eliminate the limit.on 
what older Americans on Social Security can earn. 
Medicare. With regard to Medicare, Bush supports providing more 
choice and more private sector alternatives for the elderly. He has also 
spoken in favor of medical savings accounts and offering prescription 
drug benefits to Medicare recipients. 
Al Gore: On Medicare, Gore has spoken in favor of a prescription 
drug option for all Medicare beneficiaries. He has also suggested elimi-
nating the deductible and all co-payments on preventive benefits cov-
ered by Medicare. 
Gun Control. George W. Bush: On gun control, Bush opposes the 
government mandated registration of all guns owned by law abiding 
citizens and supports their constitutional right to own guns. He has 
spoken in favor of the stronger enforcement of existing gun laws in-
stead of the creation of additional ones. Bush is in favor of instant 
background checks at gun shows. 
Al Gore: With regard to gun control, Gore supports the passage of 
new laws designed to keep guns off the streets. In the past, Gore 
worked to help enact a ban on assault weapons. He also has supported 
the Brady Law which requires background checks for gun purchases 
and imposes a five day waiting period for those states without "instant 
background checks." 
Education. George W. Bush: On the topic of education, Bush sup-
ports a "school voucher" type program that would give parents federal 
funds to be used for public and private school choice and innovative 
education programs. He further supports implementation of state ac-
countability systems in which students are tested every year in grades 
3-8 in reading and math in order to gauge the effectiveness of school 
systems. 
Al Gore: On the topic of education, Gore opposes "school voucher" 
programs, instead supporting additional funding made available to 
states for the purpose of reducing drop-out rates and increasing student 
achievement in failing school districts. Gore also wants to use technol-
ogy to increase educational productivity and increase the number of 
computers in public schools. 
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